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LOVE IN A TIME OF 
SCARCITY: AN EVENT-
HERMENEUTICAL 
INTERPRETATION
ABSTRACT
Love as a theological virtue raises difficult questions. 
How can love be a gift from God, and yet at the same 
time human beings can be praised for the love of others? 
How can love be infused by God, and also be an act of 
free will? An event-hermeneutical approach can help us 
to find answers to these questions. This article presents 
an event-hermeneutical reading of the parable of the 
prodigal son, and the phenomenological analysis of love 
by Harry Frankfurt. The fact that a person comes to love 
the object of his love implies a deep transformation of the 
will. But love is a risk: it may happen, but it need not. The 
(im)possibility of transformation is deepened by looking at 
the phenomenon of scarcity. At the end of the article, the 
author summarises five elements of a theological theory on 
the virtue of love in a time of scarcity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Thank God, love happens! That is the shortest 
possible summary of this article. We don’t know 
when it may happen; but when it does, we are drawn 
beyond what we previously considered possible. 
Love is an event that knocks us out of our hinges. 
And yet we long for it to appear. And we should love 
others: the persons we know and live with, and the 
poor, who live among us but have no names and 
no faces.
We begin our argument with some hard question 
about love as a theological virtue. If love is a gift from 
God, does that mean that human beings can only 
wait for this gift to arrive? What is the relationship 
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between this gift and the human virtues of love and charity? Can it be a 
virtue, even though it is a gift from God? Recently, in Catholic theology, 
there has been renewed interest in the so-called theological virtues, and 
specifically in the contribution of Thomas Aquinas on this topic. We will 
draw on this debate in order to elaborate on the perplexity of love as a 
theological virtue. 
From which hermeneutical perspective should we answer these 
questions? In section three, we will introduce the hermeneutics of event 
as developed by Ingolf Dalferth. The hermeneutics of event focuses on the 
dynamic process of meaning construction that takes place when we come 
to the understanding of the event of love (i.e when love “happens”). 
In the next step (section four), we will show that an event-hermeneutical 
interpretation of love helps us to understand the theological virtue of 
love. We will argue along two complementary lines: we will interpret the 
event of love in the text of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 11-32), and in the 
phenomenological analysis of the event of love as presented by the ethicist 
Harry Frankfurt. Based on this event-hermeneutical interpretation of love, 
we will answer the questions raised in the first section.
From a practical theological perspective, it is not enough to know how 
(theologically) love happens; we also need to understand the embodied 
human condition in which it happens. We will show that the perplexity of 
love is magnified if we understand the phenomenon of scarcity. We will 
draw on the theory of scarcity as developed by Mullainathan and Shafir 
(2013). Scarcity reflects a mindset, related embodied practices, and a 
context. If we have a view of the interconnectedness of these elements, 
we can understand that a sustainable transformation in the life of the poor 
is difficult to realise.
So: how can love bring change in the lives of people who exist in 
scarcity? In section six, we summarise five basic ideas for a theological 
virtue of love which can bring deep and sustainable change in people’s 
social lives.
2. LOVE AS A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE
In the last few decades there has been a revival of virtue ethics within 
moral philosophy and theological ethics. In order to become virtuous, it is 
helpful to observe others who have mastered the art of living a good life. 
A person grows in virtue when he or she puts into practice what it means 
to be virtuous. And by practising virtue, one comes to understand what it 
means to be virtuous. Virtue ethics has influenced Christian ethics, through 
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Augustine, and through Thomas Aquinas, who incorporated Aristotelian 
thought on virtue ethics (Hendriks, Goris & Schroot 2015:1). 
At the same time, virtue ethics changed within a Christian frame of 
reference. The most important virtues, or cardinal virtues (Justice, 
Temperance, Prudence and Courage), were supplemented by the virtues 
of Faith, Hope and Love, which were then considered to be the most 
important. These virtues did not have their final criterion in human honour 
(Van Tongeren 2012: 155-158), but in God, as transcendent reality. They 
are infused in humans by God, and therefore not (just) the result of human 
self-development. 
This shift raises many questions. Firstly, can a virtue be a matter of 
human excellence, and yet also be “infused by God”? Secondly, could we 
ever understand what this final “end” is, which is God? And finally: how 
does love emerge, if it is not something that human beings can control? 
What does this “infusion by God” imply for the “freedom of the will to love”? 
We will address these questions on the basis of the debate on the view 
of Thomas Aquinas on the theological virtues. In the revival of virtue ethics, 
there is renewed interest in the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas on virtues in 
general, the theological virtues, and the relationship between them. We will 
first expand the definition of a theological virtue according to Thomas, and 
formulate three questions. These questions will lead us into the perplexity 
of what we call love from a theological perspective. We will elaborate on 
this perplexity at the end of this section.
What is a (theological) virtue, according to Thomas? 
A virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives righteously, 
of which no-one can make bad use, and which God works in us, 
without us.1 
This was a widely accepted definition at the time of Thomas, fabricated 
in the 12th century by Peter Lombard from elements of the writings of 
Augustine; in particular, from his De libero arbitrio (Te Velde 2015: 9). For 
Thomas, the four intelligible causes of virtue are present in this definition 
(Te Velde idem).
• “Good quality” refers to the formal cause. Virtues are dispositions 
“which not only originate from certain acts, but also make someone 
1 This definition is found in STh I-II q.55 a.4. This formulation is based on the 
English translation of The Summa Theologica of the Fathers of the Dominican 
English Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981) (reference in 
Stump 2015:11). 
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disposed to act in a certain way” (Van Tongeren 2015:47). When you 
have a disposition towards something, you are both able to do it and 
inclined to do it, at the same time!
• “Of the mind” refers to the material cause or natural substrate in which 
the virtue exists. Virtues exist in and express the human self, which is 
constituted by reason and by passion. In the human self, there is no 
passion without a connection to reason, and vice versa. For Aquinas, 
passions are subject to reason and moved by reason (Stump 2015:8). 
Through reason, our virtues are oriented to truth; in other words, when 
we love, we are convinced that the object of our love is worthy of being 
loved. At the same time, reason enlightens our appetite (passions) by 
showing its desired object as a good (Van Tongeren 2015:50).
• “By which one lives righteously, of which no-one can make bad use” 
refers to the final cause of virtues. The finality of virtues is the good. 
In an Aristotelian ethics, the moral good can be realised through 
self-development. Thomas (in line with Augustine) is aware of the 
“brokenness” or sin of human beings, who can fail to do what is 
considered to be good, or even have the will to do what is evil. But 
no-one can make bad use of the theological virtue of love, because 
they have a final end in God. The final end of love has a perfectness or 
excess, because it is aimed at God. If a love happens that originates 
from God and has its end in God, it is a good without limits. The perfect 
good in life is beyond human self-realisation, but we can participate in 
it as a gift.
• “Which God works in us, without us” refers to the efficient cause that is 
God, who through his death works in us (Te Velde 2015:29). As stated 
above, the perfectness of love stems from God. But love can only be 
perfect if this virtue also transforms our human will. The Aristotelian 
virtue ethics only knows about reason and appetite (passion), but not 
about the human will and its defect, as introduced by Augustine. Love 
can only aim for the unlimited or perfect if our will is transformed by 
God. “In us, without us” refers to a will that is liberated from its limits or 
brokenness (Van Tongeren 2013:166). We are moved by love, as if it is 
not an act of our will. When love happens, pure passivity seems to take 
over. It seems as if the human will is transformed, in the sense that it is 
freed from its un/willingness. 
We will now raise three questions. Each question formulates a perplexity 
which seems characteristic of the logic of love. By “perplexity”, we mean 
a juxtaposition of ideas that do not seem to coincide.
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Firstly, can a virtue be a matter of human excellence, and also be 
“infused by God”? Are theological virtues and moral virtues connected, or 
unrelated? We align with the position that they are distinct but connected. 
According to Stump (2015:15) Aquinas developed a three-layered theory of 
moral disposition: dispositions acquired by practice; those infused by God; 
and gifts of the Holy Spirit. If not all levels would contribute to the art of 
leading a good life, why would Thomas construct a three-levelled theory? 
This connectedness can be grounded conceptually by the argument, 
according to Aquinas, that all moral virtues presuppose love or charity 
(Te Velde 2015:31). The reverse too is presupposed by him: charity must 
be connected with the moral virtues, which are acquired through practice, 
in order to transform everything in society. “The infusion of grace extends 
through the virtue of charity to the moral sphere of the cardinal virtues” 
(Te Velde 2015:42). So there are strong arguments for seeing love as a 
theological virtue connected to moral virtues (the cardinal virtues, firstly; 
but ultimately to all virtues). But this results in a perplexity; namely that love 
is a gift of grace, and at the same time a moral disposition for which human 
beings must be praised, because it is the result of self-development. 
A second question is: if God is the final end of love, could we ever 
understand this final end of what we love? As stated above, moral 
dispositions have an intellectual and a passionate (“of the appetite”) 
dimension: we comprehend love as the truth of our moral disposition, and 
we are filled with happiness by it – which induces an intention to act. 
However, the logic of this formula leaves us with a perplexity. The truth 
of the love of God cannot be comprehended by reason. Can we understand 
what the final end of love (which is God) is? Can we understand the 
perfection (the excess, ultimacy and finality) of this love, which is God? On 
the dimension of passion (desire), several authors suggest an openness 
that human beings have for supernatural joy or happiness. Our desire has 
a transcendental openness towards a kind of happiness greater than we 
could dream of (Van Tongeren 2015:56). And Stump suggests that Aquinas 
holds a second-person concept of love, in which the beloved dwells in the 
lover. Aquinas states:
The ultimate perfection, by which a person is made perfect inwardly, 
is joy which stems from the presence of what is loved. Whoever has 
the love of God, however, already has what he loves, as is said in 
1 John 4:16: ‘Whoever abides in the love of God abides in God, and 
God abides in him. And joy wells up from this’ (Stump 2015:19).
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Does this suggest that joy convinces us of the presence of what is in fact 
love? And does this then mean that we do not understand the final end; 
that we are convinced by a passion that dwells within us? 
Thirdly, how does love emerge, if it is not something human beings 
can control? What does this “infusion by God” imply for the “freedom of 
the will to love”? Is this the end of what we call “free will”? This issue 
incorporates perhaps the strongest perplexity of all: how can we think of a 
human disposition that we enact, without an involvement of the will? How 
can we presume a powerlessness to act on the basis of love, in the heart 
of our power? 
3. HERMENEUTICS OF EVENT
The theological virtue of love is characterised by perplexity; e.g. what is 
the love that God works in us, without us? We think we can understand this 
perplexity from a hermeneutics of events. We follow Ingolf Dalferth (2016), 
who identifies three types of hermeneutics, based on the differences in the 
way in which the intepretandum is defined. Interpretation is a sign-process 
in which someone (the interpreter) interprets something or someone 
(interpretandum) on some basis (the basis of interpretation) in a particular 
context and situation (the context of interpretation). The interpretandum 
(the object of interpretation) is the object that one is trying to understand. 
It may be: 
• either linguistic or non-linguistic texts (works),
• the authors who produce texts and the recipients who make use of 
texts (subjects), or 
• the process of life in which producing and understanding texts is 
embedded (event).
Dalferth identifies three types of hermeneutics in theology, based on the 
guiding idea of what one is trying to understand: works, subjects or life-
events. We will define the different types of hermeneutics according to the 
analysis of Dalferth, and argue why we think that an event-hermeneutical 
approach is helpful for understanding the perplexity of love.
“A hermeneutics of works understands the interpretandum as 
the product of a producer, using the actor-act model as paradigm” 
(Dalferth 2016, Chapter 3, Section 2). Cultural phenomena, texts, music, 
pictures and buildings are produced by someone from whom they are 
distinct. These realities can only exist because they are made by someone 
who has a certain intention to produce this work; but at the same time, they 
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have their own meaning. The intention of the producer co-determines the 
existence of the work, and guides the way it needs be correctly understood 
in the light of the original context of production.
Whether one follows the classical view of God as author of the book 
of Scripture or the modern view of the Bible as a canonical collection 
of ancient writings spanning the time of more than a thousand years, 
for a hermeneutical theology so oriented the central category is the 
meaning that is found in a particular signifier (medium) because the 
meaning has been given to it or will be given to it – by the author or 
the recipient or both (Dalferth 2016, Chapter 3, Section 2).
The second type of hermeneutics that Dalferth describes is a herme-
neutics of the subject. “A hermeneutics of the subject understands 
the interpretandum as the self-understanding displayed within every 
understanding” (Dalferth 2016, Chapter 3, Section 3). In every unders-
tanding there resonates always the self-understanding of the author and 
the self-understanding of the recipient. According to a hermeneutics 
of suspicion and preconceptions, this self-understanding is present in 
every understanding.
The twentieth-century philosophical hermeneutics of Martin 
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hans Blumenberg have 
so been read and understood by many: as versions of a subject-
hermeneutics that – whether by analysis of being, effective 
history, or phenomenology of variation – has to do with the self-
understanding of people in the world, in the world of culture, or in 
history (Dalferth 2016, Chapter 3, Section 3).
The third type is a hermeneutics of events. 
It is not the author, but the text that stands in the foreground, and 
indeed in such a way that neither the producer (sensus auctoris) nor 
the product (sensus operis) is the hermeneutical interpretandum, but 
rather the meaning-event of the production of the text (Dalferth 2016, 
Chapter 3, Section 4). 
The focus is not on the producer or the resulting text, but rather on the 
dynamic process of meaning construction that takes place; and not 
primarily on the active aspects of those dynamics, but on the passive-
pathic aspects. 
The hermeneutically decisive question is not from whom a construct 
of meaning stems or what it “really” says, but rather where and how 
and by whom and on what grounds it is understood, which new 
possibilities of meaning it opens up, and which old possibilities thus 
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are taken up and developed or excluded as dead ends (Dalferth 2016, 
Chapter 3, Section 4).
What counts is the event to which the text owes its existence 
and to which it bears witness through its reality as a text, as well 
as paying attention to the possibilities of understanding, self-
understanding, and life that are set free and put into play by this 
event (idem). 
Dalferth stresses that theologically, the meaning of the text reveals 
who I really am (that is, coram deo). The theological interpretandum is 
neither behind nor in front of the text, but the text as event in which our 
understanding of ourselves and the world is transformed. 
Important for Dalferth is that this transformation in the event is marked 
by contingency (Dalferth 2016:Introduction). “Contingent” implies that a 
transformation is not necessary; yet it is possible, and it happens in actuality. 
Any reference to God retains this inexplicable contingency, and even 
deepens it. According to Dalferth (2016: Chapter 12, Section 1), theology 
is a discipline about the possible, not an ontic or ontological discipline. 
The possible should not be thought of in the framework of an emergence-
continuum of the real, but as a transformation of what is given through the 
divine power of the possible. Theology, according to Dalferth, observes 
the world from the point of view of the priority of the possible above the 
reality, through its orientation around God as the reality of the possible. 
Along the same line of thinking, Cusanus argues that God is the 
absolute possibility2. Absolute possibility is positioned neither before nor 
after actuality but is eternally identical, or eternity itself. Absolute possibility 
expresses the idea that in God, possibility, actuality and their connection 
(nexus) are identical. To understand an event from the divine power of the 
possible (sub ratione dei) is to understand it from the becoming of what 
is genuinely new; or what we like to frame as “the unexpected possible of 
unlimited value” (Hermans 2015). 
2 This idea is also developed by Cusanus. In the opening pages of his Trialogus 
de Possest (1460), Cusanus argues that God is absolute possibility. Cusanus 
coined a new name for God: Possest (see Hermans 2002). 
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4. AN EVENT-HEMENEUTICAL INTERPRETATION OF 
LOVE 
Can a hermeneutics of events, as developed by Dalferth, help us to 
understand the perplexity of love? Hermeneutical theology has two primary 
tasks: the systematic explication of faith, hope and love; and a coherent 
interpretation of our reality, as it is lived and experienced (Dalferth 2016: 
Chapter 5, Section 4). According to Dalferth, the first is well documented 
as a word-event, but the second task is largely a postulate. The reason 
that this task is not carried out, may reflect a certain theological position. 
At the end of this chapter, Dalferth writes: 
While Scripture lends itself to being grasped and interpreted as the 
witness of an event of interpretation, that is not so for our experience 
of the world (idem). 
From a Catholic theological perspective, we like to see nature and grace 
– or the event of the interpretation of love, in the world and in the Scripture 
– as connected realities. What we will do in this section is to give an event-
hermeneutical reading of the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32),3 
and an event-hermeneutical reading of the phenomenology of love as 
presented by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt (2004; 2006). Finally, we will 
show that an event-hermeneutical reading of love can help us understand 
the perplexity of love as a theological virtue.
4.1. The parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32)
From an event-hermeneutics perspective, the beginning of this parable 
is very typical “And he said, ‘A certain man had two sons’” (Luke 15:11). 
Why this man, and not another? Why here, not somewhere else? There is a 
father, and something happens to him. It need not have happened, it could 
have happened to anyone and yet it happened to him. 
For an event-hermeneutical interpretation, the radical contingency of 
the event is important. The meaning is to be found in the event, through 
which we are interpreted as human beings living with and for others. The 
actions of the youngest son are unprecedented. Not only does he ask 
for his share of the inheritance; he then sells it and spends all the money 
abroad, living a rebellious life. 
His act is not just about money, but also about kinship and property. In 
the Hellenistic world, the “oikos” is the basic unit of society. It comprises 
3 We highlight only those elements in the parable which mark an event-herme-
neutical interpretation. For the commentaries, see Jeremias (1963), Evans 
(1990), Green (1997). We used the King James version as translation.
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the house of the father, the family (social relationships), and the family’s 
property (Park 2009). Through the act of selling the family’s property, the 
son creates an economic problem. But he also cuts himself off from his 
kinship with his father; and by the same act, the father loses his role as the 
pater familias who takes care of his (extended) family. 
In the scenes that follow, the situation of the young man deteriorates 
quickly: with no money, and with famine in the land, he sells himself to 
someone as a worker (Luke 15:14-16). In the Hellenised areas of the Roman 
Empire, this might be described as “indentured labour” (Harrill 1996). 
This was a legal contract in which a free person was bound “to remain 
with” (paramenein) a patron, and required to perform whatever services 
were ordered to be done. These could encompass anything; hence the 
degrading task of feeding the pigs. 
Economically, the young man lives in the same situation as the poor 
and marginalised. This reflects the power relations of the colonial setting 
of society in the Middle East, in which many people lived in deprived condi-
tions, in contrast with the ruling political and religious elite (Park 2009). 
Breaking his legal contract would have led to penalties that would have 
made his situation even worse. And yet “he stands up” (Luke 15:18a) and 
decides to go to his father. This remarkable move leads to an even more 
remarkable interpretation of what has happened: he wants to say to his 
father, “I have sinned against heaven, and before thee” (Luke 15:18b). A 
new layer of meaning is introduced: a heavenly meaning (coram deo) not 
unrelated to his relationship with his father (“before thee”). When heaven is 
involved, it is possible something unexpected could happen and transform 
the situation. 
The narrator of Luke continues: 
But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and 
had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him 
(Luke 15:20). 
The dynamic that sets this heavenly meaning in motion involves 
capacities that are all human: seeing (mind), compassion (appetite), and 
action (will). Love does not need to happen. Thank God, it does! The father 
takes the interests of his son as his own interests, and gives him an identity 
and a status within the community (oikos). 
By doing this, he also transgresses the boundaries that the economic 
system (oikos) imposes on people: 
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Boundaries of insider and outsider, the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ 
within which our identities are contested, challenged, and often 
jeopardised by strife and scarcity, where death is dealt with as often 
as life (Park 2009:520). 
In the act of compassion, a new interpretation of “oikos” emerges:4 a 
(comm)unity which is neither divided nor discriminatory, but a place of life 
and freedom for all, where all boundaries are levelled and where the real 
needs of people are taken care of.
The parable starts by introducing “a certain father”. Why this father? 
Why a crisis in this “oikos”? Can he handle this situation? In the act of 
compassion (i.e. the event), the father transforms the meaning of “oikos”, 
both on the level of economy and relationships and in the idea of the pater 
familias. New possibilities emerge which evoke an extraordinary joy for 
all involved. This is expressed by the (“heavenly”) feast that is prepared 
to celebrate the new “oikos” which levels all boundaries (Luke 15:22-24). 
Love happens, “on earth as it is in heaven”. A certain father becomes 
transparent to our heavenly Father. 
Love need not happen; but when it happens, it is because of the mercy 
and grace of the Father (God). Thank God it happens.
4.2 The event of human love
According to Frankfurt, there are four conditions necessary for the 
human experience of love. We will interpret these conditions in an event-
hermeneutical interpretation of the human experience of love. Can this 
experience present itself as a transformative event of love, in which people 
come to understand themselves as loving the object of their love? In our 
analysis, we shall use Frankfurt’s book, Reasons for Love (2004).
Firstly, the object of our love is specific: this person, or this region 
where I live (Frankfurt, 2004:41). This specific object may be concrete – for 
instance, this partner, this child, or this region – but also more abstract; 
4 Is it completely unexpected that the father shows compassion to his youngest 
son? Is what happens in this situation beyond imagination? The act of 
compassion need not happen, but it is not impossible. Carol LaHurd shows that 
when reading Luke 15, Arab Christian women did not consider the act of the 
father to be inappropriate. “The son is the father’s ‘own blood’, and the ‘loving 
heart of the father’ forgets the wrong and the lost money, and thinks only 
about getting his son back” (LaHurd 2002:259). It could have just happened, of 
course; but from an event-hermeneutical perspective, that is not the issue. The 
issue is that it happened to this father, in this situation. And when it happens, it 
transforms our understanding of community, economy, and relationships. 
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social justice, or a religious tradition or spiritual ideal. This is different from 
more general care, for the elderly or for fugitives. One does not know if 
a person working in general care is willing to help this elderly person, or 
this fugitive.
Love does not allow for this indifference. When we love, we care about 
this object of our love, and not another one. Why this person? This is not 
a conclusion based on a causal explanation. It could have been another 
person. The object of our love is contingent: not necessary, yet possible – 
and it happened to me. 
Secondly, love is “a disinterested concept for the existence of what is 
loved, and for what is good for it” (Frankfurt 2004:42). The lover wants the 
object of his love to flourish. There are no other interests or other goals 
that interfere with our love. 
Loving something has less to do with what a person believes 
or with how he feels, than with a configuration of the will that 
consists in a practical concern for what is good for the beloved 
(Frankfurt 2004:42-43). 
In the life-changing event of love, we are transformed into persons who 
are concerned for what is good for the beloved. 
Thirdly, the person who loves identifies with the interests of the object 
of his love, and not just with the disposition to promote the interests of 
the other. The person who loves takes the interests of the object of love 
as his or her own interests. The lover is selflessly devoted to the interests 
of the other (Frankfurt 2004: 61). When the interests of the other come 
into conflict with his personal interests, this is a conflict between interests 
which the loving person considers to be his own.
As human beings, we lack the capacity to fulfil all our interests, or to 
endure conflicts between our interests for a long period of time. There is a 
limit to the suffering we will endure in fulfilling the interests of our object of 
love, but we long for human fullness.5 In the event of love, we are changed 
into persons who consider the interests of the other as our own interests. 
The question is not whether we can fulfil the interests of our object of 
love in an unlimited way; but the good we desire for our object of love is 
unlimited (human fullness). 
5 For God, there is no need to forgo any opportunity for loving out of prudence 
or anxiety. “This love, which is understood as being totally without limit or 
condition, moves God to desire a plenum of existence in which everything that 
can conceivably be an object of love is included” (Frankfurt 2004:62).
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Finally, “it is a necessary feature of love that it is not under our direct 
and immediate voluntary control” (Frankfurt 2004:44). Who we love or 
what we love is not the result of our choice. We do not choose the object 
of our love; it is the object of our love that has chosen us. Love is “a 
volitional necessity, which consists essentially in a limitation of the will” 
(Frankfurt 2004:46); in other words, we cannot “not love”. We are seized by 
the object of our love (passivity) in the same moment that we direct our will 
towards the object of our love (activity).
The loving person gives himself wholeheartedly to the object of his 
love. He cannot but love this object of his love. This “surrender” does not 
happen on the basis of a choice (e.g. reflective), or an act of our will (e.g. in 
control). Here, Frankfurt makes a comparison between the role of logic in 
rationality, and the role of love in the will. 
When we discover that we have no choice but to accede to 
irresistible requirements of logic, or to submit to captivating 
necessities of love, the feeling with which we do so is by no means 
one of dispirited passivity or confinement. In both cases – whether 
we are following reason or following our hearts – we are typically 
conscious of an invigorating release and expansion of ourselves 
(Frankfurt 2004:64-65). 
In volitional necessity as in rational necessity, the uncertainty which 
creeps into our willing and our thinking is eliminated. In the same event in 
which we are overpowered by love, we are liberated from the impediments 
to choice and action. We give ourselves wholeheartedly to the object of 
our love, and act in the interest of our object of love. What is important is 
that the life-changing event of love is experienced as the movement of a 
free will. In an event-hermeneutical interpretation of love, the event that 
transforms one’s life feels like a “volitional necessity”: the person cannot 
but give himself to the object of his love – wholeheartedly! 
4.3. The perplexity of love
We now return to our questions concerning the perplexity of the 
theological virtue of love. Does an event-hermeneutical interpretation of 
love help us to understand this perplexity? We think it can, because an 
event-hermeneutical interpretation regards perplexity as a marker of the 
life-changing experience of love. 
Firstly, can a virtue be a matter of human excellence, and be “infused 
by God”? The parable starts with a certain father in an “oikos”, which is 
gradually turned in a deep crisis. By the compassionate act of this father, 
this situation is transformed into an “oikos” in which all boundaries are 
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transformed. Before the compassionate act of the father, the young son 
formulates a confession; but it is not the cause of the compassionate act 
of the father. The father sees the son, is moved by his needs, and acts in 
his interest. 
From an event-hermeneutical perspective, this compassionate love 
does not need to happen. Yet it happens. When love happens, it is a gift. 
Love can be considered a human excellence, but at the same time it is an 
unexpected possible act. From a biblical perspective, the gift has a Name, 
a beginning and an end (God). This gives people trust that love will happen. 
Thank God, love happens! 
In his phenomenological analysis of love, Frankfurt stresses that we 
care about this object of our love, not any other one. Now, caring can be 
considered meritorious: if we care, we are concerned about the interest 
of the other. But love is more than this: the lover cannot “not love”. The 
phenomenological analysis suggests that the perplexity of the will is 
implied in the logic of love.6 We need to take care of something and at the 
same time we are “overwhelmed” by the object of our love.
A second question is: If God is the final end of the theological virtue 
of love, can we ever understand what this final end is that is God? As we 
said above, in the act of compassion (i.e. the event), the father in Luke 
transforms the meaning of “oikos”, both on the level of economy and 
relationships, and in the idea of the pater familias. This act opens up new 
possibilities – a final end, which evokes an extraordinary happiness in all 
involved. But this final end is not expressed in a description of the new 
“oikos” which levels all boundaries. 
No; what happens is the preparation to celebrate an extraordinary 
feast (Luke 15:22-24). The biblical text seems to suggest that we can only 
understand this final end in the form of praise. In our praise, we make room 
for the object of our praise (God) to show Himself in his Alterity. So it is not 
a predictive way of defining the final end, but an opening of the heart for 
the future of the new “oikos” without limits. 
From an event-hermeneutical understanding, this perplexity is 
characteristic of the life-changing event of love of God, but also of the love 
of a certain father. The happiness expressed in the praise manifest itself 
6 As we stated previously, there is a difference between the biblical tradition 
and a phenomenological analysis of love, in the sense that the love of God is 
without limit. But if our analysis is correct, this is not a difference in terms of the 
experience of perplexity; it is a difference in terms of the degree of trust which 
believers can have, based on the unlimited love of God. 
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in the movement of the heart (will) in the phenomenological description 
of love. In the event of love, our heart is opening itself to the good of our 
object of love in a perfect or unlimited way. The question is not if we can 
fulfil these interests in an unlimited way; our heart is moved towards the 
perfect or unlimited good of our object of love. 
In an event-hermeneutical interpretation of human love, we come 
to understand ourselves as passionately striving to act in favour of the 
perfectness of our object of love that wants to emerge in the future. For 
this transformation of the will, it is not required to know the final end: it 
requires a movement of the will that aims at the unlimited good of our 
object of love.
Thirdly, we formulated the question: What does this “infusion by God” 
imply for the “freedom of the will to love”? Is this the end of what we call 
“free will”? In the phenomenological analysis of love, we saw that love can 
be seen as a “volitional necessity”. It seems as if the will is freed from the 
burden of willing, and human beings give themselves wholeheartedly to 
the object of their love. It is characteristic of the meaning event of love that 
it feels as if the lover cannot “not love”. It is precisely this perplexity which 
a theological definition of the virtue of love expresses by the “infusion of 
God”. This volitional necessity is also characteristic for a certain father in 
Luke. There is no rational explanation for the compassionate act of the 
father: it is an act of gratuity. 
5. SCARCITY
Scarcity can be defined as “a subjective sense of having more needs than 
resources” (Mullainathan & Shafir 2013:4). Scarcity is an embodied problem 
with many faces: economic, social, organisational and psychological. If 
you are born poor, the chances of you moving higher on the social ladder 
are very small. Congregations struggle with scarcity in terms of members, 
money and volunteers. Young urban professionals struggle with the 
scarcity of time, due to the speed of a life characterised by the influences 
of globalisation and acceleration. It is an embodied problem that reflects a 
mindset, related embodied practices and a context, in an interconnected 
way (Mullainathan & Shafir 2013). 
There is no blueprint for change in instances of scarcity. Change in 
mindset and practice can only be found in deep transformation in the 
concrete settings of persons and communities. It is precisely for this 
reason that in this article we focus on the problem of scarcity. Deep 
transformation is more than “fixing the problem”; and this is where love 
comes in (see next section).
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Scarcity can have many forms. We can distinguish between:
• Economic scarcity (poverty), i.e. the experience of having more needs 
than material resources; 
• Social scarcity (loneliness), i.e. the experience of having more need for 
social contact than available social bonds;
• Organisational scarcity, i.e. having more needs than resources in terms 
of members, money and volunteers;
• Time scarcity (being stressed), i.e. having not enough time for too many 
activities.
As an illustration of what poverty means in the daily life of people of 
the poor in South Africa, we refer to a research rapport of the Institute of 
Justice and Reconciliation (2017).
Since 2002, Afro-barometer has asked South Africans how often 
they had to go without enough food, enough clean water, medicine 
or medical care, enough cooking fuel, and/or a cash income during 
the previous year. Respondents who had access to all necessities 
all the time would report ‘never’, while those who were deprived 
of any of these five necessities at some point would respond ‘just 
once or twice’ , ‘several times’, ‘many times’ or ‘always’. [In 2015] 
About three in 10 citizens went without food (30%), water (31%), 
and medical care (29%) at least once. (…). Levels of lived poverty 
vary significantly by race, province, level of education, and place 
of residence (rural or urban). Analysis by race shows that never 
going without enough food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, and 
a cash income is most common among Indian (81%) and white 
(79%) South Africans. In contrast, only 28% of black and 47% of 
Coloured South Africans never experienced deprivation of these 
five basic necessities. (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2017: 
194-195)
We will now present the three interconnected elements of Mullainathan 
and Shafir’s (2013) theory of scarcity.
“Mindset” refers to the processes and mechanisms of the mind that 
occur when we feel we have too little, and how that shapes our choices and 
our behaviours. The scarcity mindset is characterised by both a positive 
and a negative process. The positive mechanism is focusing: scarcity 
captures all our attention, all our energy over anything else. Focusing is 
characterised by a sense of urgency, and heightened productivity. The 
negative process is one of neglect, caused by the mechanism of tunnelling. 
Scarcity leads us into a tunnel, so that we neglect other (possibly more 
important) things that we value (idem:28). 
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While our mind is drawn to scarcity, all other things are inhibited, i.e. 
harder to reach. We do not make trade-offs using a careful cost-benefit 
calculation. The tunnel magnifies the costs and minimises the (long-term) 
benefits. Secondly, according to Mullainathan and Shafir, scarcity reduces 
our “bandwidth”. 
Bandwidth measures our computational capacity, our ability to pay 
attention, to make good decisions, to stick with our plans and to 
resist temptation (idem:41-42). 
The focus on scarcity is involuntary. It captures our attention, and 
impedes our capacity to focus on anything else. People have fewer mental 
resources, and are more impulsive. They tend to focus on immediate 
rewards, and their willpower is affected.
A second element (next to mindset) is the patterns of practices and 
habits that keep us trapped in scarcity. The authors call this the “scarcity 
trap”. This is the process by which the “initial scarcity is compounded by 
behaviour that magnifies it” (idem:126). Two features define the scarcity 
trap: being one step behind, and juggling. Scarcity draws the mind 
towards the behaviour the person needs to avoid. If you have an endemic 
shortage of food, money or time, you magnify the behaviour that is causing 
the problem. It is like juggling, but focusing only on the ball that is ready 
to drop (tunnelling). You do not see the next ball that is going to drop. In 
your practice, you are always one step behind. And then when you see the 
next ball fall, you strengthen the behaviour which you should actually stop.
The third element is contextual factors (local and global) that influence 
scarcity. For example, our society is characterised by acceleration; i.e. 
we do more in less time. According to the sociologist Hartmut Rosa, 
acceleration is a complex phenomenon with (analyticly) three different 
social categories: technological acceleration, social acceleration, 
and pace of life. Technology helps us to do more in less time. Social 
acceleration refers to rapid changes in social networks creating instability 
in social relationships. And pace of life refers to an endemic “time famine” 
in modern society. According to Rosa, this process of acceleration is part 
of a changed relationship of people to the world, in which people relate to 
the world as a resource (Rosa 2016). 
The three elements are deeply interconnected; i.e. the scarcity 
mindset is a contextual outcome (rather than a personal trait) encouraging 
behaviour that keeps us trapped in scarcity. We sometimes like to blame 
the poor or lonely or dying church communities or over-stressed persons 
for their “misery”: they simply don’t try hard enough! In reality, the problem 
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of scarcity is not so easy to overcome, because of the interconnectedness 
of the issues. Simple solutions don’t work; people fall back into old 
practices and habits; and the influence of the context in which they live 
creates alienation. 
6. LOVE IN A TIME OF SCARCITY
We now come to the end of our journey. What is the place of love, defined 
as a theological virtue, in a time of scarcity? Do we need it? Do we need 
it now, perhaps more than ever? The phenomenon of scarcity reminds 
us of the fact that it is not easy to bring about sustainable change in the 
lives of people, congregations, families, etc. There are no easy solutions, 
no quick fixes, no blueprints. If we accept this, we might then be open to 
thinking that we need a completely different understanding of the mission 
of Christian communities (and churches) to “love the Lord your God and 
love thy neighbours” (Mark 12:30-31). Why? Because on the one hand, we 
miss the perplexity of love (or to put it more bluntly: love is a risk!). On the 
other hand, we miss the interconnectedness of the factors that cause the 
problem. Based on our line of argument, we will formulate five basic ideas 
for a theological virtue of love that can bring deep and sustainable change 
in the forms of people’s social lives. 
(1) What we can learn from the theory of scarcity is the fact that 
the problem of poor, lonely, over-stressed or dying communities is 
in many cases a very complex one, due to the interconnectedness of 
mindsets, embodied practices, and context. If we speak about change 
or transformation of the situation of the poor, etc., we should do so in 
terms of this complexity. If we don’t do this, we run the risk of speaking 
in a naïve way about change and transformation. There is a growing body 
of knowledge in the social sciences about this complexity (as illustrated 
by the scarcity theory). Theology must incorporate this knowledge when 
dealing with issues of change and the transformation of people. If we do 
not, our ideas will be not only naïve but also too speculative.
(2) Another thing we can learn from the theory of scarcity is that we 
cannot expect sustainable change if the will is not transformed. Deep 
transformation of the will is precisely what characterises the event of love. 
We often think of the poor, lonely, over-stressed, etc. only as objects; it 
is also important to see them as agents of love. Being the object of love 
brings the experience of compassion and trust. When love happens in their 
lives as agents, it transforms them into different people. It gives focus to 
something which fulfils their lives, and disrupts the process of tunnelling. 
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(3) Do we love the poor, lonely and over-stressed? Love can happen; 
but it may not. Love is a risk! This is precisely what distinguishes the 
theological virtue of love from an Aristotelian definition, which is based on 
human excellence. We are seized by the object of our love as something 
perfect which comes as a gift. We experience it as a passion to act as if 
the interest of the other is our interest. And we experience this love as a 
volitional necessity: we cannot but love, wholeheartedly.
(4) Change or transformation is difficult because of the interconnec-
tedness of mindset, practice and context. If we want to create change, we 
need mimetic spaces in which we can create new realities for the social 
life forms in which we live. Here, Wenger’s concept of “communities of 
practice” could be helpful. Firstly, a community of practice is characterised 
by mutual engagement in a practice (Wenger 1999: 73). Love happens, but 
only between people who meet each other face to face. Without active 
engagement in a practice, there is no community. A second feature of a 
community of practice is the common meaning assigned to the practice. 
This meaning is negotiable, but in the community of practice we share a 
collective understanding of this practice. Thirdly, a community of practice 
is characterised by the development of a common repertoire of tools, 
ranging from stories, symbols, gestures, practices and objects to buildings 
and roles (Wenger 1998:82). We are inclined to call our mindset a tool. 
All these tools derive their meaning from their place and function in the 
community of practice.7 
(5) Finally, much of our effort to bring change in the lives of people is 
ultimately unsuccessful. We try hard, and we are motivated by love for 
the object of our love, but it does not result in a sustainable change. If we 
want to be successful, we need to start from the specific configuration of 
the problem situation of the people we want to help; and together with 
them, co-construct a plan of action. The best approach to dealing with a 
situation such as this is practice-oriented research (Hermans & Schoeman 
2015). It is research in which the problem owner defines the problem and 
the research goal. It produces practical knowledge about the changing of 
this problem in the context in which people live. 
7 For a more elaborate introduction to this idea of the community of practice, see 
my book on Participatory Learning (Hermans 2003:226-230).
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